MICHAEL A. SPENCE
Name: A. Michael Spence
Born: 1943, Montclair, New Jersey, U.S.
American economist who, with George A. Akerlof and Joseph E. Stiglitz, won the
Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 for laying the foundations for the theory of
markets with asymmetric information.
Spence studied at Yale University (B.A., 1966), the University of Oxford (B.A.,
M.A., 1968), and Harvard University (Ph.D., 1972). He taught at Harvard and at
Stanford University, serving as dean of the latter's business school from 1990
to 1999.
Through his research on markets with asymmetric information, Spence developed
the theory of ?signaling? to show how better-informed individuals in the market
communicate their information to the less-well-informed to avoid the problems
associated with adverse selection. In his 1973 seminal paper ?Job Market
Signaling,? Spence demonstrated how a college degree signals a job seeker's
intelligence and ability to a prospective employer. Other examples of signaling
included corporations giving large dividends to demonstrate profitability and
manufacturers issuing guarantees to convey the high quality of a product.
Name: A. Michael Spence
Born: 1943, Montclair, New Jersey, U.S.
American economist who, with George A. Akerlof and Joseph E. Stiglitz, won the
Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 for laying the foundations for the theory of
markets with asymmetric information.
Spence studied at Yale University (B.A., 1966), the University of Oxford (B.A.,
M.A., 1968), and Harvard University (Ph.D., 1972). He taught at Harvard and at
Stanford University, serving as dean of the latter's business school from 1990
to 1999.
Through his research on markets with asymmetric information, Spence developed
the theory of ?signaling? to show how better-informed individuals in the market
communicate their information to the less-well-informed to avoid the problems
associated with adverse selection. In his 1973 seminal paper ?Job Market
Signaling,? Spence demonstrated how a college degree signals a job seeker's
intelligence and ability to a prospective employer. Other examples of signaling
included corporations giving large dividends to demonstrate profitability and
manufacturers issuing guarantees to convey the high quality of a product.